Strategic Subcontracting
Could this be China’s new maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean?

The waters of Somalia are a lifeline of the global economy, carrying a significant share of global trade. Any major development here is bound to attract scrutiny from Somalia’s neighbors and external powers with strategic interests in the region.
The Somalia–Pakistan Naval Deal
In August 2025, Somalia and Pakistan entered into a naval cooperation deal, formalized through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defence Cooperation. The agreement will last for five years, during which Pakistan will provide comprehensive assistance to Somalia’s navy, including general military training, officer education at Pakistan’s Staff and War Colleges, vessel maintenance, equipment modernization, and technology transfer. Oversight will be handled by a Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC), which will meet annually.
For Somalia, this deal promises to address the recurrent challenge of maritime piracy and support the Somali Navy’s modernization effort. For Pakistan, cooperation with Somalia represents an opportunity to establish presence and influence in a strategically important region where other global players are already jostling for position. Through the JDCC, Pakistan also positions itself to influence Somalia’s maritime security posture for the next five years and possibly beyond.
A Deeper Strategic Layer?
Some observers (see references below) suggest that the Somali-Pakistan naval cooperation deal has another underlying layer, particularly since Islamabad continues to struggle with maintaining its navy’s blue-water capability due to financial constraints. Pakistan is also heavily dependent on Chinese military equipment and platforms and is deeply embedded in China’s strategic frameworks.
Given these challenges and the close Pakistan–China relationship, analysts cited in the source material point to Beijing pulling the strings behind Pakistan’s advances in Somalia. This geopolitical play, referred to as “strategic subcontracting,” presumably reflects Beijing’s shift from visible and direct military involvement (such as in Djibouti) to more subtle ways of expanding its maritime security apparatus through friendly navies in the Indian Ocean.
The argument is that Beijing wants to avoid scrutiny and political complications associated with overt military presence through basing. By relying on Pakistan, the argument goes, Beijing will not only secure its maritime trade but also indirectly influence Somalia’s strategic culture, doctrine, and naval modernization via a mechanism called “doctrinal outsourcing.”
Doctrinal Outsourcing Explained
Simply put, doctrinal outsourcing is a strategy through which a major power indirectly shapes another country’s military thinking without formal entanglements. Instead of delivering doctrine itself, the major power uses a closely aligned partner as the conduit. The sources describe the underlying effect as gradual: operational procedures, training content, and equipment reliance pull the recipient navy into the strategic orbit of the distant patron. In turn, the sponsoring power gains influence over crucial sea lanes while maintaining plausible deniability.
Plausibility and Limits
All that said, this remains a hypothesis rather than an established fact. Pakistan may simply be pursuing its own regional ambitions, and Somalia may be drawing on accessible partners to rebuild capacity. China’s benefits could also be incidental rather than deliberate. It is also worth noting that the sources proposing this theory originate from India, a country with clear strategic rivals in both Beijing and Islamabad.
Still, there is enough smoke to justify watching where the wind blows. Strategic subcontracting is plausible but not proven. The coming years will test whether this deal marks a new blueprint for Chinese influence in the western Indian Ocean or whether it remains a bilateral capacity-building initiative between two states with their own priorities.
Looking Ahead
There are several areas to watch in the coming years to evaluate if and how strategic subcontracting might take root. One is the flow of military infrastructure, both hard and soft, between the countries: do Chinese military systems and doctrines begin moving into Somalia via Pakistan? Another is the training pipeline: how many Somali officers cycle through Pakistan, and to what extent does their training reflect Chinese doctrinal influence?
Whether a third party quietly benefits from the Somalia–Pakistan deal is a question only time and careful observation will answer, potentially offering lessons for other African security partnerships.
References
https://sundayguardianlive.com/news/top-5/beijings-blueprint-pakistan-as-the-test-case-for-africa-155648/
https://www.wionews.com/world/djibouti-mogadishu-continuum-mapping-a-china-friendly-maritime-chain-1761157949865
https://zeenews.india.com/world/two-patrons-one-fleet-the-risks-of-turkey-pakistan-overlap-in-somalia-2968667.html
https://newsable.asianetnews.com/world/pakistan-navy-somalia-mou-capacity-gaps-horn-of-africa-maritime-security-articleshow-1v24zcq
https://rnamedia.in/opinion-and-commentry/china-horn-of-africa-pakistan-turkey-somalia-deal/9567
https://gadyalkashmir.com/2025/10/01/geopolitical-analytical-somalias-naval-pact-with-pakistan-strategic-alliance-or-chinese-proxy-expansion/
https://news.ssbcrack.com/the-djibouti-mogadishu-corridor-chinas-expanding-maritime-influence-in-the-horn-of-africa/
https://www.timesnownews.com/world/asia/unhelpful-ally-why-pakistans-somalia-pact-could-weaken-maritime-security-article-152922269
https://www.eurasiareview.com/26092025-is-pakistan-chinas-shadow-player-in-somalia-oped/

