Rwanda Celebrated for Copying China’s Homework in Military Development

Photo by Master Sgt. Thomas Mills / U.S. Army Africa, via Flickr, CC BY 2.0 – no changes made.

Rwanda has been the subject of international attention and criticism in recent months for its involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Among the headlines have been attempts by the United States to broker a peace deal between Rwanda and the DRC. While the peace deal, signed on June 27, 2025, is promising, it remains to be seen whether it will bring about lasting peace in the region among other efforts.

In the midst of international scrutiny, Rwanda—especially under Paul Kagame’s leadership—has received praise in China for modeling its military development on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This, according to an article published on several Chinese sources, reflects two decades of Rwanda drawing from and adapting the Chinese playbook of development. The author notes, however, that Rwanda’s approach has not simply been a copy-and-paste of the Chinese model but is based on “digesting,” “absorbing” and “adapting” the Chinese experience.

Although the article does not represent official Chinese government views, engaging with it is useful for understanding how Rwanda’s transformation is interpreted within Chinese discourse. Such interpretations are closely tied to China’s military soft power and broader diplomatic efforts in Africa. At the same time, the article sheds light on the exercise of African agency—an idea often highlighted in China–Africa relations—particularly within the military sphere.

According to the article, what exactly has Rwanda adopted from the PLA to earn the reputation of being the most “Chinese-like” military force in Africa?

1. Officer training in China: The author notes that since 2005, Rwanda has sent a substantial number of military officers to train in China, focusing specifically on combat command, counterterrorism tactics, and special operations skills. The source claims that approximately 73 percent of Rwanda’s active-duty officers have undergone Chinese military training—a process described as a profound, structural transformation that reaches “into the bones” of the trainees. If this figure is accurate, then it suggests an institutuional level transformation that goes beyond training a few handpicked elite officers.

2. Structural and institutional modeling: The author notes that “from military command academies to infantry training camps, Rwanda’s military construction has almost entirely copied the Chinese model.” This suggests that Rwanda has adopted the Chinese military architecture in setting up various foundational institutions such as officer training schools, command education systems, and combat training facilities.

3. Military culture and symbolism: The article highlights Rwanda’s adoption of symbolic and cultural practices modeled directly on the PLA. For instance, it describes how Rwandan soldiers march in Chinese-style formations and use Mandarin commands during parades, particularly evident during the 2019 National Day military parade. This performance was described as “neatly aligned, stepping in Chinese-style goose steps, shouting rhythmic slogans,” which the author likens to “an African version of the PLA.”

4. Chinese military equipment procurement: The article explicitly notes that Rwandan troops use Chinese-made weaponry, including the PCL-09 self-propelled howitzer and the HJ-series (“Red Arrow”) anti-tank missiles. These weapons were showcased during public military parades, reinforcing the idea that Rwanda is not only training its soldiers like the PLA but also equipping them similarly. The procurement of such equipment suggests a growing military-industrial relationship between China and Rwanda and aligns Rwanda’s battlefield capabilities more closely with Chinese standards and doctrine.

Such discourse must be understood within the broader ambit of China’s military soft power in Africa. As China continues to emerge as a global power, Beijing has promoted not only its vision of global security governance in Africa but has also actively deepened its defence ties with African armed forces. This effort has been pursued through high-level defence visits, the placement of military attachés, and increased collaboration between African militaries and Chinese defence firms.

While the article glosses over contentious issues—such as Rwanda’s role in the DRC conflict, even going so far as to celebrate it—and overlooks potential challenges to Rwanda’s strategic independence, it nonetheless offers valuable insight into how the country exercises agency in its military transformation. By thoughtfully digesting, absorbing, and adapting elements of the PLA’s model, Rwanda demonstrates that African states are not merely passive recipients of foreign influence but active architects of their own security trajectories.

Looking ahead, elements of Rwanda’s military trajectory may appear, to some extent, in other African contexts—particularly in ways that go beyond the simple acquisition of Chinese weaponry. China has already become Africa’s largest arms supplier, with countries like Tanzania sourcing up to 90 percent of their weapons from China—arguably making it the most PLA-like military on the continent. A key measure of success for this cross-institutional blending will be the extent to which African militaries are able to adapt external models—or components thereof—to their local contexts, enhance operational effectiveness, and retain strategic autonomy.

Coming soon: an interactive map tracing China’s expanding security engagements across Africa. Built from open-source material—stay tuned.