PLA on Parade: China Marks Military Presence in Comoros
On July 6, 2025, the island nation of Comoros, located in the southwestern Indian Ocean, marked 50 years of independence with a military parade. On display, alongside the hosts, were units from Tanzania, Morocco, and—most notably—China, represented by a detachment from its military base in Djibouti. This marked the first time the PLA was invited to such an event in Comoros, which reflects growing military ties between the two nations.
According to a Chinese government website that reported on the parade, Brigade General Youssouf Idjihadi, Chief of the Defence Staff of the Comorian National Development Army, expressed gratitude for the PLA’s attendance, noting that Comoros looks forward to developing stronger bilateral and military ties with China. Below is a screenshot of the parade as documented on CASR’s map which is still a work in progress.

China and Comoros have had relatively limited military engagement compared to many African countries. However, a notable step was taken in 2008, when Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie met with Comorian Chief of Staff Salimou Mohamed Amiri in Beijing.
Their discussions focused on expanding cooperation between the two armed forces, with both sides expressing a desire to strengthen military exchanges and deepen bilateral ties. Liang described the relationship as a model of equality, unity, and cooperation between a large and a small country. Salimou highlighted the deep friendship between their militaries, voiced hopes for broader collaboration, and reaffirmed Comoros’ support for the One-China policy. Below is a screenshot of this event on CASR’s map.

Key Takeaways
The main takeaway from the recent military parade in Comoros is that China is increasingly viewed as a credible security partner in Africa. The PLA’s invitation to participate in Comoros’ independence celebrations highlights Beijing’s unique positioning as a non-Western actor with growing influence in African and Indian Ocean security affairs.
While some have speculated that Comoros could become the “next Djibouti,” there is currently no evidence that China is pursuing plans to establish a military base on the island. Such a prospect is further complicated by what appears to be a growing aversion in Africa—particularly in West Africa—towards hosting foreign military bases.
It is also worth noting China’s ability to engage smaller nations—a quiet contrast to displays elsewhere. Beijing’s outreach to countries like Comoros demonstrates its commitment to building defence partnerships not only with major powers, but also with less prominent states.
Concluding Thought
If the recent parade in Comoros is any indication, China is finding a receptive environment for defence partnerships in the southwestern Indian Ocean. While it is still too early to predict the full trajectory of these ties, symbolic gestures like this suggest that Beijing’s military diplomacy is steadily taking root in the region. How this evolves—whether through expanded cooperation, training programs, or future infrastructure—remains to be seen, but the groundwork is clearly being laid.